Trump Eyes Action on North Korea in 2018
A year of erratic U.S. rhetoric and steadily escalating diplomatic and economic pressure
has failed to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear and ballistic
missile programs, leaving the frustrated Trump administration to
reconsider its options going into 2018 as the world wonders whether it’s
on the edge of war.
“We’re not committed to a peaceful resolution we’re committed to a resolution,” President Trump’s national security
adviser, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, told BBC News this week.
“We
want the resolution to be peaceful, but as the president said, all
options are on the table. And we have to be prepared, if necessary, to
compel the denuclearization of North Korea without the cooperation of
that regime,” McMaster said.
Inside the administration and in Congress, officials are looking at a
wide range of options for dealing with the regime of Kim Jong Un. Some
are conventional, like continuing to pressure countries to fully enforce
international sanctions meant to starve North Korea of cash and isolate
it diplomatically.
Some are less so: Two U.S. officials said Trump
could consider taking the largely symbolic step of naming a retired
military official to coordinate North Korean policy across all of
government. That job currently falls to the special representative for
North Korea policy, career diplomat Joseph Yun. Some in Congress want
the administration to take a much harder line on businesses and
countries that flout sanctions.
“We
are not on the same sheet of music, when it comes to North Korea, in
the U.S. government,” a senator’s senior foreign policy aide who tracks
the issue closely told Yahoo News.
And
there are more radical options short of an all-out war, including a
one-off strike that a former senior U.S. official referred to as “the
bloody-nose option” to try to force Pyongyang to negotiate.
In
that scenario, the United States would hit a target relevant to North
Korea’s missile or nuclear programs, far from civilians, Dennis Wilder,
the top East Asia expert on George W. Bush’s National Security Council,
told Yahoo News in an interview on December 15. It would be consciously
modeled on Trump’s decision to order airstrikes on a Syrian airfield in April in response to the regime’s chemical weapons attack on civilians.
“They
have a belief that they can do this,” Wilder said of the
administration. “Call it ‘the kick in the shin,’ or ‘the bloody nose
option’ — you take a single strike, you make sure that the Chinese, the
Russians, everybody knows that it’s a single strike.”
That
would reduce, though not eliminate, the likelihood of escalation,
Wilder said, adding: “You could take that facility out and say, ‘Enough,
Mr. Kim, it’s time for you to come and talk.’”
Another
option, two congressional officials and one former White House official
told Yahoo News, would be for the United States to show it’s serious
about interdicting ship-to-ship smuggling. That tactic, aimed at getting
around international sanctions, involves North Korean ships swapping
cargoes with foreign vessels, usually bearing refined petroleum
products.
“I
expect we’re going to see more pressure from the U.S., in the form of
harsher sanctions (both multilateral and unilateral) and increased
maritime interdictions,” Abraham Denmark, a former deputy assistant
secretary of defense for East Asia under Obama, told Yahoo News via
email.
Washington has already imposed unilateral sanctions
on ships that visit North Korean ports. But now, the sources said, some
administration officials advocate boarding ships suspected of carrying
contraband. The United States would invoke the principles of the
Proliferation Security Initiative, a global post-9/11 program to prevent
the spread of dangerous technologies. But Washington would have to
tread extremely carefully: China never joined the PSI, and boarding a
Chinese firm’s ship without Beijing’s at-least-tacit approval would test
Sino-U.S. relations. And just who would do the boarding is another
extremely sensitive question.
Regional
tensions have steadily built over the past few months, with North Korea
testing its most powerful nuclear weapon yet and firing its most
advanced missile to date — a rocket widely believed to be able to reach
anywhere on U.S. soil. From a technical perspective, it’s not clear yet
whether the regime has a guidance system reliable enough to hit a
specific desired target, or whether it has perfected the technology
needed for its warhead to survive the heat of reentry into the
atmosphere.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration successfully wrangled 15-0 U.N. Security Council votes to toughen sanctions, returned North Korea to the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism,
cheered as nations like Singapore and Sudan cut economic ties with the
regime in Pyongyang, and successfully encouraged allies — like Germany —
to reduce diplomatic engagement with the secretive Stalinist prison
state. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson publicly suggested North Korea
would be welcome at the negotiating table without needing to agree to
preconditions, then seemed to rescind the invitation. Tillerson also
surprised longtime observers of Asian power politics by revealing that
the United States and China — Pyongyang’s de facto patron — had
discussed in considerable detail how to secure North Korea’s nuclear
weapons in the event the regime collapsed.
At
home, the administration has stepped up its campaign to paint North
Korea as a bad actor. First, there was a late-November op-ed by senior
State Department official Brian Hook in the New York Times that compared Kim’s elite entourage to intestinal parasites.
Then, on Tuesday, Trump homeland security adviser Tom Bossert publicly
blamed North Korea for the WannaCry “ransomware” attack that disabled
computers around the word in May — an unusual step, given how difficult
it can be to definitively determine the authorship of online attacks.
“North
Korea has done everything wrong as an actor on the global stage that a
country can do,” Bossert later told reporters in the White House
briefing room. “President Trump has used just about every lever you can
use, short of starving the people of North Korea to death, to change
their behavior. And so we don’t have a lot of room left here to apply
pressure to change their behavior.”
In
a little-noticed section of the White House’s new National Security
Strategy (NSS) — a nonbinding document that lays out the president’s
view of the world — the administration effectively laid claim to the
right to preemptively and unilaterally disrupt future North Korean
missile launches.
“The
United States is deploying a layered missile defense system focused on
North Korea and Iran to defend our homeland against missile attacks.
This system will include the ability to defeat missile threats prior to
launch,” the document says.
The
NSS did not spell out whether this ability would involve traditional
military force — like cruise missile strikes — or high-tech capabilities
like hacking or the introduction of a virus. It also does not lay out
how the United States would determine whether a missile poses a threat,
or to whom.
The warning about possible preemptive U.S. action doesn’t come as a major surprise. U.S. officials, past and present, have discussed that possibility for years. The New York Times reported in March that former President Barack Obama waged clandestine cyberwar on North Korea’s missile launches.
“The
president has made it clear that he would not tolerate a North Korean
capability to strike the United States with nuclear weapons, and it is
highly possible that North Korea may attempt to cross that threshold in
2018,” said Denmark, the Obama official. “President Trump’s response
will be the critical moment in this crisis and will define geopolitics
in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come.”
The blustery talk from Washington — threatening to rain “fire and fury” on North Korea, or “totally destroy” it, or suggesting North Korean leaders “won’t be around much longer” — while playing down the value of negotiations has made some wonder whether the administration is giving diplomacy a shot.
Amid
talk of war, another North Korea expert predicts that the Trump
administration would be “muddling through” 2018 without dramatic shifts
on policy.
“The
risk of ending program militarily is enormous compared with the risk of
managing it,” Mike Green, who preceded Wilder as the top Asia hand on
Bush’s National Security Council, told Yahoo News.
“If
they shoot back, it’s tens of thousands killed in a conventional war
and potentially millions if they use chemical or biological weapons, or
target Tokyo with a nuclear missile,” he added.
Still,
Green said, “living with North Korea, it’s not going to be comfortable.
The term ‘live with’ actually sounds too comfortable.” Instead of the
mutual deterrence of the Cold War, Washington needs to prepare to
counter a nuclear North Korea’s efforts “to blackmail, intimidate,
threaten” in a kind of “ugly deterrence” he said.
Still,
there are some things that could be a prelude to armed conflict, like
the withdrawal of U.S. government officials or their relatives from
South Korea, as happened in the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of
Iraq.
“If there’s an evacuation, that means I was wrong,” Green said.
Another clue could be how big business, including firms with ties to China, operates in South Korea.
“Keep an eye on companies. Do corporations visibly start pulling out dependents, or changing their supply chains?” Green said.
Pyongyang has a say in the standoff, of course.
“Look
at what — and when and where — the North Koreans test,” Green said. “Do
they demonstrate their capability undeniably by blowing up something in
the atmosphere?”
There
are other things to watch as well, Green said, like whether and how the
United States helps South Korea and Japan develop offensive military
capabilities and whether and how Washington tries to calm skittish
allies in the region.
Another open question is “does Tillerson stay in office, and does he get enough of a leash to try diplomacy,” Green said.
The
next few months will also provide a clue as to “instability within
North Korea – answering the question of just how stable is the regime
under sanctions pressure, and as sanctions ramp up,” said Green.
But the most important factor to watch is Trump himself.
“The
real question is if the president will use military force to prevent
North Korea from crossing the threshold of achieving a credible nuclear
deterrent,” said Denmark. “If that happens, there is no prediction what
happens next.”
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